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Abstract 
This paper explores the connections between financialisation in the green economy and 
the material commodification processes that underpin this economy. It argues  that 
these connections are important and can be usefully conceived in terms of spaces of 
mutuality. These spaces of mutuality direct attention to the material processes of value 
creation at the level of real environmental assets. That these material processes appear 
thin, sluggish, fractured, hybridised or stalled in practice invites new modes of analytical 
engagement. One important mode of analysing these emergent green projects is to 
emphasise their status as durable processes of becoming or what could be called 
markets-in-the-making, by going beyond forms of market and economic reductionism. 
Michel Foucault's analysis of neoliberalism and his idea of “organising actions” prove 
useful in this regard. Foucauldian organising actions render markets-in-the-making 
projects visible as durable governmental apparatuses made of disparate elements that 
are geographically specific, historically contingent and are aligned with an overarching 
market telos. Drawing on an empirical case of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation plus carbon stock enhancement and sustainable forest 
management (REDD+) in Nigeria‘s Cross River, the paper analyses organising actions 
along four meta-processes – problematisations, visions, implementation, stabilisation. It 
concludes by highlighting the wider implications for work on environmental 
financialisation. 
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1. Introduction 
The green economy captures a range of economic and environmental interventions that 
rest on the notion that contemporary environmental and financial crises together 
present opportunities for growth through targeted investments in “green” projects and 
activities that will supposedly lead to socio-ecological sustainability (Cavanagh and 
Benjaminsen, 2017; Lohmann, 2016; McAfee, 2015). Financialisationi, a critical aspect of 
this emergent economy, is part of a general “shift in the gravity of economic activity 
from production to finance”, driven by the increasing possibility of abstracting financial 
activities from real commodities (Foster, 2007 p.1). This shift has left scholars with a 
fundamental disjuncture between the realm of “ungrounded” finance and  the 
underlying material commodities (Aalbers, 2015; Bracking, 2015; Ouma, 2014, 2015, Pike 
and Pollard, 2009). 
 
However, this disjuncture is tempered by claims and spaces of explicit connections 
between the “real” and the “virtual” in the green economy. Scholars continue  to 
examine the nature of the relationship between the performativity of finance and 
underlying material environmental assets (Bracking, 2015; Büscher, 2012; Lohmann, 
2016; Robertson, 2012; Sullivan, 2013a, 2013b, 2017). While virtualisation and 
decoupling are a striking feature of environmental financialisation (like traditional 
financialisation), understanding the full range of ways in which green financialisation 
reworks the social world entails a deepened appreciation of the material basis and socio- 
ecological connections. For Bracking (2015 p2351), this link between the virtual world of 
financial derivatives and the world of environmental commodities and assets is not to be 
calibrated along “an empirical scale from materiality to virtuality”. Rather, it should be 
understood in terms of co-existence and co-production. This paper further specifies 
these connections in terms of spaces of mutuality made up of varied and reciprocal 
relations across multiple nodes. 
 
Spaces of mutuality invite us to grapple with the depth of financialisation in the green 
economy by empirically scrutinising its material grounding through widespread 
processes by which value is negotiated and contested in places. Such an empirical 
engagement or what Bracking (2015 p.2347) calls “research effort to drill-down” 
complements the flourishing analyses of the abstract evaluative and exchange logics of 
financialisation in the green economy (Knox-Hayes, 2010; Callon, 2009; Bracking, 2015). 
Various leanings of political economy have been productive in elaborating the contours 
of material commodification processes. Yet, their keen attentiveness to substantive 
markets has also left us with a need to understand market-making processes as durable 
moments of their own, without a tendency towards market reductionism or economic 
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reductionism. Clearly, acknowledging the processual nature of markets in Marxian 
analysis of neoliberal natures (Fletcher and Büscher, 2017) also warrants detailed 
elaborations of what this might mean conceptually and empirically. Similarly, emergent 
theorisations of economisation still problematically privilege the role of economic and 
financial experts in creating markets in new domains (Callon, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 
2009). They are less attentive to how and why a whole range of actors come to be 
involved in market-making processes, and the variety of ways in which they rationalise 
their involvement. So, how does one account for the creation of markets in new domains 
without being limited by blunt categorisations (with assumptions of linearity) of market 
success/market failure; pro-market/ anti-market inside/outside of the market? 
 
This paper argues that a Foucauldian approach provides useful insights to these 
questions. A reading of neoliberalisation based on Michel Foucault’s elaboration of 
“organising actions” is a timely intervention in economic and political geography. Though 
Castree (2010 p1734) once observed that “few critical geographers have so far used 
Foucault’s work on “governmentality” to examine the neoliberalisation of nature”, there 
is now a budding literature in this area using governmentality, sometimes reframed as 
“environmentality” following Arun Agrawal (e.g. Fletcher, 2010, 2013; Li, 2007, 2014; 
Lövbrand and Stripple, 2011; Stephan, 2013; McGregor et al., 2015). This paper 
contributes to this body of work by recovering Foucault’s reading of neoliberalism as a 
specific rationality, integrating this with a general understanding of governmentality as 
dispositif or apparatus – aspects that are often treated separately in environmental 
governmentality literature. In other words, this paper addresses the question of market 
organisation in neoliberal policy, by posing same as a question of governmental 
intervention thereby stressing the geographical-historical dimension (i.e. place-based 
dimension) of this process and its properly social nature. This helps to address, in quite 
important ways, the analytical-empirical imperatives suggested by spaces of mutuality 
between environmental financialisation and material environmental assets. 
In the rest of the article, I discuss spaces of mutuality, before elaborating on the notion 
of organising actions. I then turn to an empirical example of a carbon offset project, 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus forest enhancement 
and sustainable forest management (REDD+). Using a case of Nigeria’s Cross River, I 
show how the pursuit of REDD+ as a suite of organising actions entails the assembling of 
the conditions of possibility of markets and financialisation. I outline four meta- 
processes – problematisations, visions, implementation, stabilisation – that suitably 
capture the range of elements and practices that align around an overarching 
teleological discourse of market and finance. I then draw some conclusions. 
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2. Spaces of mutuality between financialisation and material commodification in the 
green economy 
The virtual performativity of environmental finance has important connections with the 
material aspects of the social world. One way to conceptualise these connections is to 
think of them as constituting spaces of mutuality. Here we see the historical and the on- 
going role of the financial sector in creating, recreating, and sustaining the social 
architecture for new environmental commodities, exemplified in the pivotal roles of 
actors like the Chicago securities trader, Richard Sandor, and the international banker, 
Pavan Sukhdev (Lohmann, 2008; Knox-Hayes, 2010; Newell and Paterson,  2010). 
Another connecting node is evident in how these green financialisation projects seek to 
acquire legitimacy through claims to address specific environmental problems, thereby, 
connecting them – if thinly and exploitatively – to certain material environmental basis. 
This is true even for fraudulent carbon investments which regularly claim links to certain 
carbon offset projects in distant tropical forests (e.g. see Chris Lang’s REDD-Monitor).ii 
These claims to environmental amelioration are an important point of difference from 
traditional financialisation with its exclusive tendency towards complete isolation into 
“black box[es]”, thereby  making  no  similar explicit claims to materiality for    legitimacy 
(Ouma, 2015 p.227). 
 
Yet, this mutuality is also apparent in the very nature of the commodities through which 
value is elicited in the green economy. These new environmental commodities (such as 
carbon and biodiversity offsets) are already so virtual, abstract and finance-ready that 
Robertson, for instance, observes that “the resemblance between carbon credits and the 
consolidated debt obligations is not casual” (2012 p.396; Bracking, 2015). This partly 
informs the tendency among critical analysts to analyse environmental financialisation in 
overlap with processes of commodification of nature (Sullivan, 2013a, 2013b, 2017; 
Robertson, 2007, 2012; Knox-Hayes, 2010). And notably, the complex layers of 
abstraction through which the green economy is carried on are a significant marker of 
reality, at once facilitating and masking “the very fact that [material] appropriation is 
taking place” (Lohmann, 2016 p15). For Büscher (2013), those abstractions and 
representations through which value is elicited also get reified as new realities (see also 
Sullivan, 2017). 
Even when actual financialisation appears thin and commodification appears less 
successful in reality, the variety of (often unintended) socio-ecological impacts they 
precipitate can be profound (Bracking, 2015; Cavanagh et al., 2015; Leach and Scoones, 
2015; Sullivan, 2017). For instance, Lohmann (2016 p12) notes that “while units of the 
new natures may not be successful commodities in their own right, they are often 
attractive as a part of risk-sensitive investment packages that include more conventional 
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assets such as oil timbers, water rights...”. In some cases, the mere proclamation of the 
prospect of financialisation – as in carbon offsetting schemes like REDD+ –drives a range 
of material responses not least changes in resource management policies and practices, 
in developing countries. Linked to this is the creation of what Fletcher et al. (2016, 
following Borup et al., 2006) call “economies of expectation” that arise from (often 
empty) promises of financialisation, and which in turn shapes future possibilities of 
financialisation as, for instance, disillusioned local actors come to distrust and challenge 
projects. These processes may also reinforce existing power asymmetries in resource 
governance, and they may serve to foreshadow new shifts in environmental governance 
and conservation – for instance, as evident in the securitisation turn in forest and 
biodiversity conservation (Asiyanbi, 2016; Cavanagh et al. 2015; Duffy, 2014). As such, 
these spaces of mutuality call for a renewed focus on the ongoing neoliberalisation of 
the environment as an important step in understanding how the financialisation of the 
green economy is organised from below, how it functions and to what effects in specific 
places (Lawrence, 2015; Aalber, 2015). 
Geographical literature is clear that the declared paradigmatic shift to commodify 
various socionatures anew has not materialised in places as fast-paced commodification 
and financialisation. What is widely observable are a variety of processes that seek to 
herald the market in novel spaces thereby reworking not merely the economic but the 
broadly social resource-making arena (see Bigger, this issue; Dempsey, 2013). These 
processes often appear thin, variegated and frustrated (e.g. Dempsey and Suarez, 2016; 
Fletcher, 2013; Fletcher et al. 2016; McAfee, 2015). Some manifest as market hybrids 
combining with other forms of social regulation (e.g. Cavanagh et al, 2015; McAfee and 
Shapiro, 2010) or as pseudo-markets which Milne and Adams (2012 p133; see also 
Robertson, 2007) call “market masquerades”. Yet, insofar as these market-heralding 
processes “are rendered reasonably coherent for a significant period of time” and with 
specific effects, they can hardly be dismissed as outright failure (Bridge and Jonas, 2002 
p.759). Indeed, as Brenner et al (2010 p.332) suggest, “empirical evidence underscoring 
the stalled, incomplete, discontinuous or differentiated character of projects to impose 
markets or their coexistence alongside potentially antagonistic projects... does not 
provide a sufficient basis for questioning their neoliberalised, neoliberalising 
dimensions”. It is thus possible, indeed, desirable to analyse these neoliberal processes 
as substantive moments, not overwhelmingly defined in terms of their market success or 
failure. In other words, how might these processes be understood as forms of market-in- 
the-making, accounting for the range of ways in which they draw upon and shape the 
social world? Addressing these questions also contributes to navigating the seeming 
impasse in the payment for ecosystem services (PES) literature which continues to 
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question the neoliberal nature of projects that fail to meet certain market attributes (see 
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Fletcher and Büscher, 2017; Hahn et al. 2015). The next section turns to Foucault’s 
“organising actions” and REDD+ to begin addressing these concerns. 
 
 
3. Foucauldian organising actions and REDD+ 
For Foucault, neoliberalism as a specific, historical kind of governmentality eschews 
naïve market naturalism. Rather markets are to be constructed and sustained through 
vigilant intervention (Foucault, 2010). An important part of this intervention is what he 
calls “organising actions”, which involve intervention not on the immediate conditions of 
the market per se, "but on more fundamental, structural, and general conditions of the 
market" (Foucault, 2010 p.139). Organising actions are the variety of responses to the 
reality that the market, a supposed general social regulator, is not naturally and 
spontaneously existing at every level of society. They are directed at creating and 
shaping not merely economic conditions but conditions (social, technical, human, 
juridical, political, ecological etc) of existence of the market. These are actions, which 
Foucault notes are "more interesting" and more expansive in their reach, allowing the 
state to intervene "on the society in its fabric and depth" (2010 p.145). While organising 
actions are sometimes taken to mean legal and administrative structures for markets 
(e.g. Fletcher, 2013), it is abundantly clear that the scope of organising actions is much 
broader. Precisely, the broad social domain of organising actions, he argues, is 
"increasingly become(ing) the object of governmental intervention" (2010, p.141). As 
such, Foucault notes, while governmental intervention on economic processes (i.e. 
regulatory actions) must be kept to the minimum, "so must it be heavy when it is a 
matter of this set of technical, scientific, legal, geographic, let's say, broadly, social 
factors" (2010, p.141). 
For instance, Foucault shows the application of organising actions in response to Walter 
Eucken's diagnosis of the German agricultural problem in the middle of the last century. 
Once he had diagnosed the problem as that of not being "fully and exhaustively 
integrated within the market economy", Eucken would propose a variety of  actions at 
the level of farming population, provision of technical inputs, provision of training, 
changing legal framework of farms and lands, adjusting soil conditions and working on 
the climate (Foucault, 2010 p.140). Organising actions then represent a moment in 
neoliberal policy where interventions on broader social domains (rather than the 
immediate conditions of the market) are deployed to produce or foster markets in 
domains where they previously were inexistent or limited. 
A project like REDD+ then, is an example of organising actions, insofar as it is concerned 
precisely about organising conditions of existence of a national, forest-based carbon 
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commodity regime. This scheme aims to reduce carbon emission by transferring cash 
incentives (through market and non-market instruments) to developing countries to 
reduce deforestation rates against set baselines. Certified reduction thus generated 
could then be sold to developed countries or businesses, or could be inserted into 
bilateral emission offsetting schemes such as that ongoing between the California Air 
Resource Board and subnational projects in Brazil, Indonesia, Canada and Nigeria 
(Lueders et al., 2014). The financial industry is building a range of financial instruments 
around these emergent carbon commodities (see Bracking, 2015; Knox-Hayes, 2010; 
Callon, 2009). An example is a London-based investment company, Carbon-Plus Capital 
LLP which is in the process of developing financial instruments “to address the risks and 
opportunities in implementing REDD investments“ with an ongoing interest in Nigeria 
and Mozambique (Carbon-Plus Capital, 2016). The company claims interest not just in 
carbon offsets and investments, but also in engaging with activities on the ground to 
ensure“equity and fairness in the flow of benefits to local communities and landowners; 
projects do not simply shift the problem of habitat destruction elsewhere; Carbon 
finance will result in emissions reductions that would not otherwise have occurred” 
(Carbon-Plus Capital, 2016). These kinds of claims to and engagement with material 
commodification processes are vital sources of legitimacy for financial entities. 
A burgeoning geography of REDD+ is thus emerging, covering more than half of the 54 
African countries, 18 of the 20 Latin American countries, and at least 19 countries in 
Asia-Pacific. Being widely implemented in three phases, the “readiness“ and the 
“investment“ phases (the third being “performance payment“ phase) capture much of 
the groundwork required to construct a carbon commodity regime. Globally, these 
processes have relied on development grants totalling about US$4.5 billion in promised 
finance and about $1.5 billion in disbursed funds as of December 2015 (Nakhooda et al., 
2015). Yet, it is the promise of an ultimate carbon trading and financialisation that 
infuses REDD+ with drive and optimism (Newell and Paterson, 2010, McAfee, 2016). 
Despite optimism at the global policy level, the implementation of this scheme (like 
similar carbon forestry schemes) in locales continues to be frustrated by technical and 
social difficulties so that they often and increasingly appear thin, sluggish, fragmented, 
and even stalled in some cases (Angelsen et al., 2012; Asiyanbi, 2015, 2016; Fletcher et 
al., 2016; Fletcher, 2013; Lund et al., 2017; Milne and Adams, 2012; Cavanagh et al., 
2015). These challenges are partly linked to the nature of carbon which proves difficult 
to tame and market (Loftus and March, 2015; Bumpus, 2011). Failure to really 
incentivise willing forest preservation for REDD+ and the need to secure property rights 
in newly valourised forests have invited intensified surveillance, stiffer law enforcement 
and the use of state military and private security (Asiyanbi, 2016; Cavanagh et al.,  2015), 
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reflecting extensive state (re)regulation and militarization. In short, the outworking of 
REDD+ on the ground falls short of the smooth-sailing, fast-paced commodification ideal. 
Yet, REDD+ is not bereft of a market ethos. Climate change mitigation through offsetting 
is market-oriented. Tropical countries and forest communities get projected as economic 
subjects who will respond rationally to protect forests in response to modifications in 
environmental variables (i.e. incentives). And the REDD+ telos is a new commodity and 
market exchange regime. As such, for projects like REDD+ this disjuncture between the 
commodification ideal and the frustrated local processes reflect but also goes beyond 
the inherent neoliberal contradiction between vision and outcome (see Deschenau and 
Paterson, 2011; Fletcher, 2013). Rather REDD+ readiness is better understood as a 
market-in-the-making project, driven by a suite of organising actions. If as Foucault 
notes, the social conditions of existence of markets are increasingly the focus of 
governmental intervention, then, organising actions intersect with a distinct "regime of 
practice" by which REDD+ gets "effectively mark(ed) out in reality" (Foucault, 2010 
p.19)iii. 
Thus REDD+ represents an example in which to understand how a suite of organising 
actions constitute a governmental terrain having "a density and a significance of its own" 
(Miller and Rose, 2008 p.54). This entails tracing “how the coupling of a set of practices 
and a regime of truth forms an apparatus” that seeks to create carbon commodities in 
space and time (Foucault, 2010 p.19). As such, analysing REDD+ as organising actions 
holds a number of implications which inform the empirical analysis that follows. One, 
since organising actions involve interventions on real social and biophysical elements 
that are geographically specific, then analyses of organising actions are necessarily 
grounded, thus contributing to what Ouma calls (2014 p.162) “alternative reading ... 
from below”. Two, organising actions are analytically durable in themselves, making 
them a substantive realm of analysis that should not be subsumed under settled markets 
or dismissed as failed market attempts. Three, organising actions are thus directed at 
objectives as diverse as the domains of interventions, even though these are generally 
rationalised by an overall telos of heralding markets. This plurality of aims is reflective of 
the diversity of actor groups aligned around market-making projects.  Four, 
governmental interventions emphasise the process of intervening rather than who does 
the intervention. Finally, the realisation of the overarching market goal is not inevitable. 
The following section illustrates these imperatives empirically through the case of a 
REDD+ project in Nigeria’s Cross River. 
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4. REDD+ as organising actions in Nigeria’s Cross River 
Activities leading to the commencement of REDD+ in Nigeria began in 2008, in Cross 
River State, one of the 37 federating units of the country. The state’s 7361.7 km2 of 
tropical rainforest is a significant portion of the remaining tropical rainforest in Nigeria 
and part of an important global biodiversity hotspot (Oyebo et al., 2010; Myers et al., 
2000). By 2010, Nigeria had enlisted itself in the global network of tropical countries 
implementing REDD+. By 2011, the country’s first REDD+ proposal had been approved by 
the United Nations REDD programme (UNREDD). Yet, assembling a carbon commodity 
regime in Nigeria goes beyond the coherent REDD+ programme policy or the conscious 
strategy of any individual actor or coalition (cf. McGregor et al., 2015). Analysing REDD+ 
as a suite of organising actions requires a focus on a broader carbon forestry apparatus 
in which actors converge over a range of aspirations, events, practices and technologies 
that align against an overarching teleological discourse of the carbon market (McGregor 
et al., 2015). This multiplicity is captured under four major meta-processes that emerge 
iteratively through a combination of insights from Foucault’s analytical foci (Dean, 2010; 
Bryant, 2002), literature on assemblage and apparatus (Legg, 2011; Li, 2007, 2014), and 
empirical dimensions of REDD+ implementation in Nigeria. One is problematisations, 
which capture the underpinning rationalisations that present existing conditions as 
deficient and in need of improvement. It is on the basis of these problematisations that 
the regime of government emerges. Two is visions, which refer to the policy and 
practical aims and objectives of REDD+, as a suite of organising actions. Three is 
implementation, which refers to actions and practices devoted to translating visions to 
reality. Finally, four is stabilisation, which takes account of the durability of the emergent 
apparatus, explaining how it is able to endure tension and contradictions. 
The rest of this paper elaborates these four processes, drawing on field data gathered 
between November 2013 and August 2014. It draws on in-depth interviews with 
purposively selected key actors who are directly involved in or affected by REDD+. These 
include state forestry officials, local and international non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), REDD+ officials, timber traders, and forest communities in Cross River, Nigeria. 
In addition, analyses of REDD+ documents (specifically, the National Programme 
Document, the REDD+ Readiness Programme Proposal, and the Preliminary Assessment 
Report) were combined with everyday observation of activities of REDD+ implementers, 
the state forestry commission, and forest communities. Such triangulation of sources 
and combination of data is crucial to understanding not only the rationalities but also 
the layers of practices through which the REDD+ apparatus is assembled (cf. Li, 2007). 
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4.1 Problematisations 
Neoliberalisation of the environment, like the neoliberal doctrine itself, emerged as a 
problematisation of other ways of doing things; a “criticism of a previous 
governmentality from which one is trying to get free” (Foucault, 2010 p.320). Broadly, 
neoliberalisation of the environment problematises lack of or inadequate economic 
valuation of the environment. But it is the specific, situated problematisations 
underpinning REDD+ in Nigeria that reflect key contextual conditions which are vital to 
understanding the conditions of possibility of REDD+ as a market-in-the-making project. 
Nigeria’s REDD+ emerged at the intersection of two strands of problematisation: one 
ecological and the other fiscal. An important international environment summit in 
Nigeria’s Cross River in 2008 concluded that rates of forest and biodiversity loss in 
Nigeria and in Cross River were assuming a “catastrophic” proportion. The Pre-summit 
Note (2008 p.1-3), an important document that set the agenda for the Summit, stated 
the problem via a string of alarming narratives: “the recent history of Nigeria’s 
environment has been catastrophic…. 5% of the original forest estate still stands, and a 
significant percentage of what is left is in Cross River State... Forests will disappear in 
Nigeria by 2020” (p.1-3). This document located the problem in "the long-standing 
system of viewing the forest as a source of revenue for government [which] is an 
outdated, colonial and pre-oil mentality" (Pre-Summit Note 2008 p.3). The  Summit 
would issue a communiqué with top three recommendations, asking the state to “halt 
revenue target based on timber exploitation and focus on forest conservation and 
regeneration for possible carbon finance”, “declare a two-year moratorium on logging" 
and "initiate action to take advantage of the carbon credit market” (Summit 
Communiqué, 2008 p.3). 
Meanwhile, a financial crisis was also afoot in Cross River State. Consequent upon a 
Supreme Court ruling in 2012 which upheld the transfer of all 76 oil wells of Cross River 
to neighbouring Akwa Ibom State, Cross River continued to witness a decline in its oil- 
based revenue. To appreciate the significance of this to Cross River  entails 
understanding the centrality of Nigeria's oil sector to all facets of its economy (Watts, 
2013). Nevertheless, this precarious revenue condition was only a part of what the then 
State Governor, Liyel Imoke, in the 2013 budget speech described as ''very challenging 
and inauspicious times'' characterised by ''adverse financial conditions'' (Imoke, 2012 
p.1). Cross River State owed such an enormous debt that a national daily observed in 
February 2015 that "Nobody seems to know the extent of Cross River State’s 
indebtedness" (Charles, 2015 p.1). But official records from the Federal Ministry of 
Finance put Cross River as the third most indebted of Nigeria's 37 states, though it is but 
the  27th  most populous. Much  of  these  debts accumulated  from  public  spending on 
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now-failing gigantic projects that were supposedly meant to position the state  as a 
prime tourist and business destination in West Africa. 
It is in response to this financial crisis that the state devised a new strategy of “creative 
funding” which focused on foreign direct investment, including international aid and 
grants. REDD+ is an important part of this strategy. The State Governor continued to 
reiterate government expectations of REDD+ funds, noting in both the 2011 and 2012 
government’s budget speeches that ''we expect to access substantial financial and 
technical resources from the UN-REDD'' (cf. Koch, 2016 on Tanzania). These were the 
earliest manifestations of what might be called an “economy of expectations” which is 
generative and constitutive of the particular trajectory of REDD+ in the state (Fletcher et 
al. 2016; Borup et al., 2006). This economy of expectations builds on not only the 
promise of grants from international institutions but also anticipated financialisation 
through the integration of Nigeria’s REDD+ into the global carbon market and through 
bilateral arrangements. 
As such, these two domains of problematisation– the ecological and the fiscal – intersect 
at the juncture where discourses of a financially stressed state aligned with emergent 
interests in the state (and beyond) to re-value forests and biodiversity as a creative 
source of funding that can stop alleged “haphazard” exploitation, since proponents claim 
that creative carbon finance is based on a seemingly compelling idea of “doing nothing” 
(Stephan, 2013 p.156). Between 2011 and 2013, Nigeria’s REDD+ had received a sum of 
US dollars (USD) 4 million from the UNREDD, and USD 3.8 million from the World Bank’s 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, with additional funding from the California-based 
Governor’s Climate Forest Task Force. Though these funds are significant relative to 
annual timber revenue for the state (e.g. highest pre-REDD+ annual timber revenue was 
USD 456,250), REDD+ proponents hold that even greater funds are expected in the more 
advanced phases of REDD+, as the project begins to trade carbon offsets in the 
international market, even if such promises quietly ignore the reality of precarious 
carbon finance and the unreliability of the carbon market (McAfee, 2015). In any case, 
here are the key problematisations that underpin the whole carbon forestry apparatus. 
Assembling an apparatus partly in response to these problematisations goes beyond a 
natural emergence of solutions from a field of criticism; it entails full-fledged, elaborate 
visions and plans concerning the aims and ends of the apparatus. These visions are the 
focus of the next section. 
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4.2 Visions 
Neoliberalisation of nature is orchestrated according to certain visions, that is, spaces of 
visibility within which are discernible the overarching dreams, aims and ends of the 
project. Dean (2010 p.44) calls these "the telos" of government. Organising actions entail 
multiple aims which are held together by an overarching market telos, even if the 
realisation of these aims is never guaranteed. 
For instance, in Nigeria’s REDD+, there are the formal aims spelt out in REDD+ proposal 
“to contribute to climate change mitigation through improved forest conservation and 
enhancing sustainable community livelihoods” (National Programme Document - NPD, 
2011 p.11). These are linked to even more specific readiness goals: 1. Improved 
institutional and technical capacity at the national level and in Cross River State; 2. 
Framework for REDD+ extension across Nigeria prepared; 3. REDD+ readiness 
demonstrated in Cross River State. These, in turn, are unpacked into 14 outputs, which 
are then refined into “core and indicative activities, all structured into a coherent and 
detailed results framework” (NPD, 2011 p.11). Meanwhile, the aims espoused in 
everyday discourses of experts and other key proponents are often more grandiose, 
ambitious and totalising than checklists of programmatic outcomes. It is about a wider 
mission to transform individuals, populations, processes and institutions. For local 
implementers of the programme, the aim is to enact a shift from timber to carbon 
forestry by creating an all-encompassing programme that has “something in it for 
everyone”, as the State-level REDD+ Coordinator asserts. The African Regional 
Coordinator for UNREDD, who has been influential in the Nigerian project declares: 
“REDD+ is transformational. Transformational means the following...the way  the 
policies, the measures, the fiscality, the agricultural project, the energy policy, the 
behaviour of the population go, the tendency is that all these factors bring 
deforestation.…What is needed is to change the way development is done, the way 
agriculture is done.... This is transformational, it is to change the mindset.” (Int. 28, 
UNREDD African Regional Coordinator April 2014, Calabar). 
REDD+ thus aims at “transformations” in, at least two interrelated domains. The first is 
at the level of the mindset, that is, the ways people think about themselves in relation to 
things such as forests and climate (cf. McGregor et al., 2015; Li, 2007; Agrawal, 2005). 
The second is the broader social domain of forest governance, conservation and 
development (cf. McAfee, 2015). As such, proponents seek to act on “men in their 
relations to things” such as forest, carbon, money, law, farmlands, timber, maps, among 
other things (Foucault, 1991 p.95). Officials note that communities must be “fully 
engaged... resist(ing) with every drop of their blood whoever dares to fell the forest" 
(Interviews, State REDD+ Officials, December 2013, Calabar). Logging populations    must 
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be disciplined by the Anti-Deforestation Task Force set up to enforce the logging ban for 
REDD+. The forestry institutions must be “restructured“ and traditional foresters must 
emerge as "carbon forester", equipped with new tools and capabilities for rendering 
carbon legible, measurable, and marketable. Forestry laws must be made 
REDD+enabling. The forest itself must be made to appear as carbon. 
Proponents project a REDD+ scheme that, as the State REDD+ Coordinator points out, 
“has a big promise in the sense that it's like you eating your cake and still having 
it....REDD+...is a window of opportunity for many people to come in”. And so great are 
the potentials in REDD+ that proponents declare, “currently, there is no alternative to 
REDD+” (Interview, REDD+ Consultant November 2013, London). This optimism is richly 
captured in programme documents such as the Preliminary Assessment Report, and the 
various proposals submitted to the UNREDD, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and 
the California-based Governors‘ Climate and Forest Taskforce (Oyebo et al., 2010; NPD, 
2011; R-PP, 2013). These documents and the optmistic discourses they espouse are 
products of expert knowledge in forestry, economics, remote sensing, finance, 
governance, law – expertise that transcend the economic and the financial. In any case, 
these optimistic visions and discourses find expression partly in the major practices that 
constitute the implementation of REDD+ as a market-in-the-making project. 
 
 
4.3 Implementation 
Proponents’ visions of REDD+ are being implemented through two overlapping 
categories of practices which could be roughly and tentatively understood as “people 
practices” and “landscape practices”. These two variously overlap and are mutually 
productive of each other in practice (cf. Mansfield et al., 2015). Nevertheless, this 
tentative categorisation is apt in laying bare some of the key dimensions of REDD+ as a 
suite of organising actions in Nigeria (for similar discussions on Tanzania, see Lund et al., 
2017; Koch, 2016). 
 
People practices 
 
Enacting a carbon forestry regime entails practices to shape people’s (e.g. forest 
communities, timber dealers, state bureaucrats) conduct. First are efforts to restructure 
state forestry institutions, discipline state bureaucrats and adjust forest laws. 
Restructuring required the strategic reconstitution of the highest cadre of the state 
forestry institutions to allow for the integration of NGO and transnational actors who 
claim expertise in REDD+ (Asiyanbi, 2015). This involved an overhaul of the Cross River 
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State   forestry   law   in   2010.   While   REDD+   proponents   saw   restructuring   as    an 
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administrative imperative, forestry bureaucrats conceived it as an assault on their 
profession, as a forestry director laments “Forestry is conquered …. We, the vulnerable 
are raped every day. You sit in a meeting and someone who doesn’t know anything 
[about forestry] would tell you that … teak is a weed” (Interview, Forestry Director, 
February 2014, Calabar). 
 
Also notable are measures to steer everyday forestry practice and knowledge towards 
those required for a carbon forestry regime. For instance, central to a regime that seeks 
to create value from carbon are approaches to rendering forests visible in new ways 
through new calculative logics and tools for representing forest spatiality, constitution 
and volume (Gupta et al. 2012; Leach and Scoones, 2013). One important example is the 
tool for aerial visibility, including the Geographic Information System (GIS) and Global 
Positioning System (GPS). Recognising the lack of knowledge in the use of such tools, 
proponents of REDD+ intervened. The state REDD+ Coordinator observed: "to monitor 
the forest you must have the capacity. When we came in here, most foresters had not 
seen a GPS, not to talk of knowing the relevance of GIS. So we had to purchase GPS 
units...and trained them" (Interview, State REDD+ Coordinator January 2014, Calabar). A 
new GIS laboratory was also being set up in early 2014, led by the REDD+ specialist on 
MRV, a consultant seconded by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) under the 
UN-REDD arrangement. 
 
Equally important are efforts to “change the mindset“ of communities following logics 
similar to Agrawal‘s (2005) “environmentality“. Since community forests are the target 
of the carbon forestry project, obtaining some level of community assent (no matter 
how) was considered vital to the project‘s legitimacy. Early in the project, proponents 
had sought community cooperation through the promise of huge financial rewards, 
fueling an “economy of expectations“ at the local community level (Fletcher et al., 2016). 
A community resource manager recounts how his community had held on to those 
promises “they said that ... we were going to be paid and our people will be rich… When 
the people heard it, they were excited and were celebrating…. families started thinking 
of how they were going to be millionaires” (Interview, Community Leader and Resource 
Manager, January 2014, Calabar). More recently, proponents have also employed a 
dividing practice based on the use of incentives. In view of the official ban on timber 
extraction and the halt on forest-based revenue generation by the government, the 
state decided to replace community’s long-standing timber “royalty“ payments with a 
new regime of “loyalty“ payment. While royalties were paid to landlord communities  as 
a ratio of the total volume of timber extracted from their forests (some communities 
received  as  much  as  USD  6,250  per  annum),  loyalties  are  flat  rate  payments    (e.g. 
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approximately USD 625 per community for 2013) to stimulate support for REDD+. 
Loyalties were paid to communities as a reward for cooperating with the state’s REDD+ 
agenda. Communities were deemed cooperative when they kept to the terms of the 
logging ban or when they offered community land for tree planting, or when they 
expressed no dissenting views (at least in public) towards REDD+. Meanwhile, other 
communities, timber labourers, and timber merchants continued to be disciplined and 
criminalised by the militarised Anti-Deforestation Task Force (Green, 2009). The control 
of people goes hand-in-hand with the control of the landscape. 
 
Landscape practices 
Like Li’s (2014) constitution of land as a resource, the constitution of Cross River’s forest 
as carbon entails the deployment of relevant expertise such as aerial imaging, 
translation of images, interpretation, colour-coding, formula applications and numeric 
quantification of carbon -- at the national scale (cf. McGregor et al., 2015). An example is 
the 2010 carbon survey by a network of international experts from the United Nations 
Environment Programme’s (UNEP) World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC). This 
survey made use of satellite imagery to make the confident claim that Nigeria’s biomass 
and soils store a total of 7.5gigaton of carbon (Ravilious et al., 2010). Rendering carbon 
visible in these ways entails that the forest is discursively (and ultimately materially) rid 
of multiple value and use, and webs of human interactions. This reflects a process of 
simplification and abstraction by which carbon is abstracted from all forms of bio-vitality 
and reduced to mere figures, images and numbers (cf. Sullivan, 2013a). For instance, the 
UNEP-WCMC report does not differentiate forest biomass carbon from the imminently 
spent (through extraction) crude-oil carbon in the Niger Delta, an area depicted  as 
having the greatest stock of carbon in Nigeria. Yet, this process of commodifying carbon 
is never complete. It is challenged through social contestation and by the uncooperative 
nature of carbon which is difficult to tame and exchange (Robertson, 2012; Bumpus, 
2011; McAfee, 2015). For instance, a critical coalition of civil society actors including 
Friends of the Earth Nigeria in Cross River is mobilising forest communities with the 
banner “our forest is not for sale”, challenging the ongoing commodification  of the 
forest as carbon (Osarogiagbon, 2011). 
 
 
Once rendered visible, – however partially – the carbon forest would be territorialised 
through efforts to follow carbon (already made visible from above) to the ground 
(McGregor et al., 2015). This requires near real-time monitoring of forest carbon stock, 
which is as yet virtually impossible at the national level in Nigeria and other tropical 
countries. Such monitoring and accounting would require complex baselines which 
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Stephan  (2013)  and  Karsenty  (2008)  observe  are  often  laden  with  complexity    and 
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uncertainties. Yet, many of these uncertainties are now taken for granted with 
proponents making a pragmatic shift to sub-national (also jurisdictional or nested) 
carbon and forest monitoring in Nigeria, as in many other REDD+ countries. 
As such, scalar politics is an important landscape practice here. This entails the re- 
specification of scales of forest governance in line with carbon forestry imperatives. For 
instance, the Project Idea Note (PIN) for Nigeria’s REDD+ pilots had noted: "the project is 
viable and attractive to carbon finance only if the project area includes the multiple 
community forests and forest reserves. A project considering only one of these areas 
would not be viable on its own" (Oyebo et al., 2010 p.89). Thus to make Nigeria’s carbon 
forests finance-able, they needed to be up-scaled from their community  ownership 
levels and rendered visible as clusters which are based on forest contiguity and 
biodiversity potential. These rescaling efforts are similar to what geographers Cohen and 
McCarthy (2015) describe as rescaling to ecosystem spaces, though a financialisation 
logic drives rescaling in this case. As such, REDD+ proponents insist that pilot REDD+ 
communities must be represented based on clusters and not individually or based on 
any pre-existing ancestral groupings. Proponents also used monetary incentives in 
rendering the new clusters governable, as shown in earlier discussions of ‘loyalty’ 
payments which were made at clusters levels. 
 
Landscape practices also entail securing the emergent carbon forest. Disentangling 
carbon requires efforts to rid the forest of other forms of resource relations which are 
co-extensive with the materialities of carbon offset – for instance, timber, cane, poles, 
and other forest biomass. This is a prerequisite for creating and capturing  value in 
carbon forestry (Asiyanbi, 2015; Cavanagh et al., 2015). In Cross River, the state-imposed 
logging seeks to achieve this purpose. The ban, while demonstrating government’s 
'political will', also helps to mobilise international finance for the project. Everyday 
protection of the carbon forest has entailed widespread criminalisation  and 
militarisation of the forest landscape and the entire timber economy (Asiyanbi, 2016; cf. 
Cavanagh et al., 2015). For instance, the militarised Anti-Deforestation Task force set up 
for forest protection portrayed to the Financial Times the sort of logging population it 
was up against: "...gangster-businessmen keen to protect their multi-million dollar 
industry and a generation of disaffected rural youth....'There's a price on our heads'" 
(Green, 2009 p.2). Such framing of the forest terrain as a space of deadly danger 
continues to justify the employment of violence in defending the carbon forest. Wielding 
the new forestry laws and a network of military personnel, private security, volunteers 
conservationists, and informants, the Task Force has intensified surveillance, law 
enforcement, and legal prosecution. These measures are undermining local resource 
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access, long-standing forest-based economies, and resource relations between the state 
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and communities (Asiyanbi, 2016). Yet, ironically, the Task Force covers up (and even 
abets) illegal timber dealing, elite capital accumulation in the illegal timber economy, 
and significant expansion of commercial agricultural plantation into the forests (Uzondu, 
2012; Schoneveld, 2014 cf. Bracking, 2015). While scholars ask questions of  justice 
within these emergent outcomes (Isyaku et al., 2017; Okereke and Dooley, 2010), these 
various contradictions and tensions also mean that significant efforts are directed at 
stabilising this apparatus from within. 
 
 
4.4 Stabilisation 
Pursuing REDD+ as a suite of organising actions also entails stabilisation, which gives the 
apparatus some durability, even if a risky one (Li, 2007). Since carbon forestry is built on 
an overly optimistic foundation, proponents had to keep up a discursive flourish that not 
only effaces the risky nature of the apparatus held together here – especially the use of 
violence – but also reproduces and reifies even more optimistic narratives, thereby 
projecting an antipolitics based on optimistic promises (cf. Büscher, 2013). Optimistic 
narratives continue to be perpetuated through a continual reiteration of  REDD+ 
promises in government gatherings, community meetings, NGO workshops, and other 
REDD+ forums. Important is the promise of finance which animates Cross River state in 
its financial crisis, and communities who search for “better life”. Central, then, is the 
emergent “economy of expectations” which has important implications for the future of 
the project, as communities and the government gradually become disillusioned at the 
delayed materialisation of REDD+ promises. 
Linked to the foregoing is a more material dimension of stabilisation. A great deal of 
REDD+ policy implementation continues mainly at the level of proposals, reports, 
workshops, meetings, consultancy, training, and planning, essentially what Büscher 
(2013) calls a “paper trail” (see Lund et al., 2017). Occasionally, they include pilot 
activities within pilots, showing the minimal scale of activities in relation to the 
overwhelmingly national scope of an ideal REDD+ (see Lund et al, 2017). This material 
stabilisation also involves what has been analysed elsewhere as “floating”, a practical 
process of maintaining minimal relations among supposedly synergistic REDD+ 
institution, coalitions and actors in order to minimise impacts of contradiction (Asiyanbi, 
2015). For instance, the Anti-deforestation Task Force and the REDD+ implementing unit 
of the state constantly seek to maintain a significant public distance from each other, 
covering up the contradiction in the promise of monetary incentive by REDD+ 
implementers and the deployment of violence by the Task force. 
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Perhaps most important in forging durability in REDD+ is the way this governmental 
apparatus is able to summon a variety of subjectivities across a multitude of actors. For 
instance, while some REDD+ communities once thought of REDD+ in terms of their 
interest (and some still do), others have challenged the forest protectionism 
underpinning REDD+ through petitions and protests (see Asiyanbi, 2016).  Meanwhile, 
the “carbon state” emerges at the conjuncture where the aspiration of carbon forestry 
proponents is fused with a range of other interests and aspirations in the state, even as 
the state gets hybridised by NGO and transnational actors who also pursue diverse aims 
in REDD+, including wildlife protection, community empowerment, and the greening of 
state development. It is this negotiation of interests that help to stabilise REDD+ 
tentatively. 
The four meta-processes of problematisations, visions, implementation and stabilisation 
thus appear as a suite of organising actions ultimately aimed at heralding a carbon offset 
regime. Yet, these processes show that the variety of domains, objectives, expertise, 
actors, actions and relations linked into a durable REDD+ apparatus cannot be reduced 
to or indeed analysed narrowly in terms of market success or failure. In fact, once 
market-in-the-making projects are geographically and historically anchored, the stakes 
become starker, prompting analyses that scrutinise these processes more broadly in 
terms of their workings and variegated impacts on the environment, institutions, 
communities and the broader social world, and not merely on the basis of achieving the 
aims of marketisation or financialisation (see Bigger, this issue; Lohmann, 2016). 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the link between financialisation of the green economy and 
underlying commodification processes is important and that this link can be usefully 
understood as spaces of mutuality. These spaces offer opportunities to go beyond 
current analytical preoccupation with abstract evaluative practices and performativity in 
the green economy. Taking spaces of mutuality as a starting point, this paper directs 
attention to the real commodification processes on the ground, arguing that the thin, 
hybridised, and even stalled appearance of some of these processes require new forms 
of analytical engagement. Among other things, such forms of analytical engagement 
must grapple with the properly processual nature of neoliberalisation, analysing green 
economy projects as durable moments of their own without a tendency towards market 
reductionism or economic reductionism. This requires approaches that fully account for 
the varied impacts of market-making processes beyond a narrow focus on success and 
failure.  Foucault's  organising   actions  offer   important  insights,  helping   to  link      an 
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important neoliberal policy moment, organising actions, to a general understanding of a 
governmental apparatus. 
 
As the Nigerian case reveals, if organising actions involve interventions on social (e.g. 
state institutions, communities, civil society) and biophysical elements (forests, timber), 
then analyses of organising actions are necessarily grounded in place and time. The 
convergence of various actors (beyond the state and economic experts), and particularly 
the hybridisation of the state in the case study point to the importance of the process of 
intervening rather than who does the intervening (cf. Lund et al., 2017; McGregor et al., 
2015). This also reflects the multiplicity of aims and domains of  intervention 
(institutional structure, law, state forest revenue policy, community forest governance, 
forest policing, payment schemes) targeted by organising actions. That REDD+ remains 
open-ended also indicates the sense in which organising actions do not take for granted 
the realisation of the overarching market goal. 
 
This has some implications for work on environmental financialisation. First is  that 
spaces of mutuality represent an important conceptual arena within which to scrutinise 
the “epistemology of similitude” and recognise the crucial ways in which financialisation 
in the green economy might differ from traditional financialisation (Ouma, 2014). In 
market projects that supposedly address environmental despoliation (such as carbon 
emission or biodiversity destruction), claims to material connection are critical, given 
how much hope for environmental amelioration rests upon these claims. As such, 
current emphasis on the performativity of finance in the green economy needs to be 
complemented with insights from “research efforts to drill-down”, while recognising that 
such efforts are not limited to the domain of “economic sociology”, as Bracking (2015 
p2341-7) notes, but cover a broader range of ongoing work including those by critical 
geographers, other critical scholars, and socio-environmental movements. Finally, this 
task of following up material connections can potentially unsettle the pretence of 
complexity that continues to subsume the political in financialisation to the technical 
domain of finance expert, thereby opening up spaces for wider debates and more 
political practices in finding real answers to the current socio-environmental crisis. 
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iFinancialisation refers to both the phenomenon marked by the rise of “capital markets, their intermediaries, and 
processes in contemporary economic and political life” and the various conceptualisations of this phenomenon by 
scholars (Pike and Pollard, 2009 p29). Environmental financialisation or financialisation in the green economy refers 
to this phenomenon (and it conceptualisation) evident in the development of derivates, options, hedge and other 
financial instruments in the new environmental domains of climate regulation, biodiversity conservation, and 
broadly ecosystem services provisioning. These are domains that typify specific forms of real subsumption of 
nature through the commodification of environmental disrepair. 
 
iiChris Lang’s blog site, REDD-Monitor has covered several reports of bogus investment companies claiming to buy 
and sell carbon offsets derivates. Accessible at: http://www.redd-monitor.org/ 
 
iii Although Foucault’s ideas around governmentality were framed within the historical European context, he was 
however clear about the sense in which governmentality was also to be understood in a general sense. Foucault 
referred to “diverse types of governmentality” (Foucault’s 2010 p.92), observing that “ We have been trying out 
this notion of governmentality and… seeing how this grid of governmentality, which we may assume is valid for the 
analysis of ways of conducting the conduct of mad people, patients, delinquents, and children, may equally be valid 
when we are dealing with phenomena of a completely different scale, such as an economic policy, for example, or 
the management of a whole social body, and so on (p.186 see also Fletcher, 2010). In effect, there is an opening up 
of an array of relations including those constituted in REDD+ projects and outside of Europe, to the beam of 
governmental understanding. 
